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1. Introduction 
Bertrand Russell has suggested that the $tate of our kno'R-
ledge about nature is like our knowledge about a language of 
which we know only the grammar and the syntax, but not the mean-
ings of its words. Given a statement in that language, we would 
not know the possible meanings of such a statement, nor the mean-
ings of the unknown Vlords which would make it true (1919, p. 55). 
As he says, we' know much more about t.he form of nature than about 
its matter .. But his remarks need not "be taken only as an analogy--
they apply directly to our present understanding of language. 
Our knowledge about the syntactic form of language, though far 
from co,mplete, and lacking at present a compelling explanatory 
theory to organize it {see Langendocn (1967 b)) for an effort 
to begin to remedy the latter situation), i6 formidable. Not 
so our knowledge concerning the semantic properites of language. 
The reason for this is that knowledge of the semantic propertj.es 
of sentences and discourses is not systematically obtainable; 
for reasons v1hich, unfortunately, are only rather sketchily 
supplied in the final two sections of this paper, systematic 
understanding of the meaning of lexical items can be obtained 
Cand then only for same of them), but beyond that it is in 
general inappropriate to speak: of meaning at all. In this paper, 
we thus return to the Saussurean conception of words as bel~nging 
to langue, but sentences and discourses as belonging to parole--
not because we lack the theoretical apparatus to deal with sen-
tences and discourses syntactically 1 but because we lack the 
necessary apparatus for dealing with them semantically in any 
systematic fashion. 
In addition, we support the loyal oppoeition to ger.erative 
grammar who have tried to maintain over the paist ten years that 
the ability of humans to determine the interpretation of so-called 
deviant sentences under particular contextual conditions a 
part of linguistic data. Linguistics ~ust come to grips with the 
problem of explaining this ability and of showing how it works 
in particular cases; it must not be dismissed as lying outside 
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th~ domain of linguistic eomp~tenee. I must admit, however, 
that at p:resent I have no ~erious proposals to make concerning 
this matter. 
The first two sections following this one prepare the ground 
some•11•hat for the material presented in the final tv,o, but their 
primary function is to effect what I think are some terminolo-
gical and conceptual olari!ications and improvem~nts in semantics. 
These clarifications are independ~1;t of the more controversial 
aspects of this paper. 
2. ·Selection and projection the same 
Recent work in generative grammar has made it possible :tor 
us to consider as one and the same phenomenon what had formerly 
been treated as two separate matters: grammatical selection and 
semantic projection. The bases for the identification of selec-
tion ana projection are (1) the further identification of deep 
structures with semantic structures, and (2) the essentially 
predicate-argument form of semantic deep structures. Typieallyt 
selection has been described aa the procees by which a verb, 
adjective 1 or predicate noun cat1 occur with a subject or object 
noun phrase without anomaly. '£hie can now be stated more simply 
(and accurately) as the process by which a predicate occurs with 
an argument without anomaly, Projection, on the other hand, has 
been characterized as the process by which higher-level constitu-
ents receive semantic interpretation on the hernia of the semantic 
interpretations of their parts. This process can now be stated 
as the means by which predicates impose semantic characteristics 
on their arguments. Thus in the sentencee: 
(1) ·T'n.~ child drank the water. 
(2) The child drank the stuff. 
(3) The c;:hild drank the spoon. 
we say that the predicate drink selects .the argument the water, 
but not (without anomaly) the a:2oon; and that it imposes on, or 
projects onto, the argument the stuff the information that it ~s 
liquid. 
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But there is no :point in separating and separately naming 
the processes so d~ecribad. In (1)~ we oo~ld as well say that 
drink projects onto the argument the water the information that 
it is liquid, but that this information is redµndant, since~ 
water inherently designates a liquid. Similarly in (3), drink 
may be said to project onto the s;e;oon that i.t is liquid, which 
is i.ncompatible 'llith the inherent specification of that argument 
as not being liquid. Thus, sentences such as (;) which contain 
a semantic incompatibility may be called internalll incomnatible, 
a term to be preferred to the neutral term anomalous as it also 
conveys the idea of how it is th.at such sent~nces are in fact 
semantically anomalous. Such sentences, moreover, a.re not to be 
considered u11grammatieal; this for a variety of reasons, one 
of them being that internally incompatib],e sentences may not be 
obviously sot their anomaly becoming apparent only upon semantic 
"computation, 11 as in the sentep.ce: 
(4) 1 am eleven years older than my father's brother's 
son's only cousin. 
Another reason is that a sentence may stop being internally 
incompatible .ae soon ae another sense of one of its lexical 
items b~comes acquired. Thus a person for whom screwdriver 
refers only to an instrument for turning screws :would find a 
sentence such as the following internally incompatible: 
(5) The child drank a screwdriver. 
but not as soon as he acquires for screwdriver reference to a 
particular mixed drink. In general, an internal incompatibility 
may be said to be resolved if there is some interpretation of 
the arguments in the sentence which, no matter how seemingly pre-
posterous, eliminate the incompatibility. These usually involve, 
but not necessarily a special context or a. ''possible world; 0 in 
fact knowing the context means that no resolution of incompati-
bility- has to t.ake place. The incompatibility is really a fic-
tion of the detached linguist-obeerver. 
It should be clear from considerations such as the foregoing 
that the semantic content of predieate:s--verbs, adjective5, and 
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predicate nouns--is projective. That which is projected by a 
predicate noun onto its subject noun phrase is, moreover, exactly 
as that which we are accustomed to thinking of as the character-
istics of its referents~ Thus the characteristics of the refer-
ents of woman are precisely the same as those which are projected 
onto the argument this in the sentence: 
(6) This is a woman. 
and the characteristics of the referents of wife are also that 
which are projected onto the argument tq,"!,t ;2eraon in the sentence: 
(?) That person is the wife of the mayor. 
But this is no accident since 1 as Bach (1968) has shown,. a sur-
face structure noun which ia not a predicate noun occurs in 
deep structure as a predicate noun 1 and is transformationally 
substituted for the variable which is its argument. Thus the 
sentence: 
(8) I first met my wife in· Boston. 
is interpreted the same way and has the same deep structure as: 
(9) I first met the one who is my wife in Boston. 
while the sentence: 
(10) Our chauffeur retired six months ago. 
has the same deep structure as: 
(11) 	 The one who was our chauffeur retired six months 
ago. 
;. The 	semantic content of sentences and of discourses. 
Restricting our attention for the time being to simple 
declarative sentencest we assert that t.he semantic content of a 
sentence consists of what the predicates contained in it project 
onto the arguments contained in it. In terms o.f the notio,n pro-
jection as originally proposed by Katz and Fodor (1963), the 
semantic content of a sentence is a composite of the contents. of 
its constituent noun phrases. In case the main predicate is a 
one-place predicate, (i.e., is intransitive) matters appear 
relatively straightforward; in a sentence such ae: 
(12) 	 The woman died.  
1Q4 -
tlie argument the woman simply received the. specification of 
l"'.airing died (much more than· this, of course, i's i;i,volved in the 
meaning of (12); . in, particular, attention must be paid to the 
tense of the verb, the original predicate status of woman, the 
definite article, and the inchoative character of fu {i.e •• 
its relationship to the semantic properties of~), and the 
declarative form of the sentence itself). In case the main pre-
dicate is a two-place one (i.e., is transitive), tben we require 
in addition means of describing the relationship established by 
the predicate-between its two arguments; for example, the rela-
• I 
tionship established by swallow between the whale and Jonah in 
the sentence: 
(13} The whale swallowed Jonah. 
The means that we suggest is the following: describe the two-
place predicate as separately ascribing the relationship to each 
of its arguments. In (13), then, we would say that the argument 
the whale receives the specification SWALLOWED JON.AH and Jonah, 
S\1/ALLO\I/ED BY THE WHALE. The reason for separately ascribing the 
relationship to each argument is that each one, whenever it 
occurs in a discourse following sentence (13), ia understood to 
be eo specified. Thus (14), while not internally incompatible 
in and of itself, expresses an incompatibility when taken together 
in a discourse with (13): 
(14} However, Jonah managed to escape being swallowed. 
The reason is that (14) ascribes to Jonah. the apeci:fieation NOT 
SWALLOWED, which is incompatible with its specification from 
(13). Similarly, it is possible to construct a sentence ascribing 
to the whale a specification which is incompatible to the one 
ascribed to it by (13). 
In general, we may say that the specifications received by 
arguments are not limited to those which it receives in any 
particular sentences, but that these specifications pile up 
throughout a discourse. Thus, we may generalize our characteri-
zation of semantic content to the discourse; the semantic content 
of a discourse consists of the specifications projected onto the 
arguments contained in it. 
- 105 -
The specifications ascribed to particular arguments, more-
over, may carry over.from discourse to discourse, the resulting 
conglomeration being what we may call our knowledge or beliefs 
a.bout the world, which may in turn be widely shared. Accordingly, 
such sentences as the following, in the context of such shared 
knowledge and belief, express incompatibilities: 
(15) 	 Lyndon Johnson was defeated in the U.S. 
presidential election of 1965. 
(16) Paris ia the capital of Sweden. 
Notice, in particular, that (16) is doubly incompatible; it is 
incompatible with what we know Cor believe) about both Paris and 
Sweden. Of course, knowledge about the world need not come from 
prior verbal experience, but rather from prior sense experience 
L'l general. Thus one may have never had occasion to talk a.bout 
or hear about the color ink used to print the New rork Tirnest but 
one's exper.ience with having aeen that paper will doubtless lead 
one to perceive an incompatibility in a sentence such as: 
(17) The headlines of the New York Times are printed 
in blue ink. 
It is quite possible that what I am getting at here is what the 
British linguists Malinowski, Firth, Halliday, and others have 
had in mind by the context theory of meaning--this despite the 
disparaging things I have to say about their version of that 
theory in Langendoen (1967)--excep.t I would not grant that what 
I have been talking about in this section is meaning at all, 
but rather semantic specifications of particular arguments with• 
n.b., particular reference. On this distinction, see especially 
the recent work of John Lyons (1964 1 1966) on semantic theory--
his terms are meaning and having meaning. 
4. The 	meaning of lexical items. 
We are accustomed to thinking of the meaning of a lexical 
item as consisting of a distillation of the semantic contents of 
tokens of that item used without incompatibility in sentences .. 
This distillation is, in standard dictionaries, expressed as a 
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definition of that item• the definition itself being either.a 
sentence or a linguistic expression readily convertible, without 
addition of semantic content, into a sentence. This accustomed 
way of thinking about meaning strikes me as fundamentally sound. 
One consequence of this, not often noted, is that meaning is not 
a property of sentences of parole at all--such sentences cannot 
even be said to have meaning {pace Lyons), but only, to repeat 
the :rather vague term used in the preceding .section, semantic 
content .. Sentences only take on meaning upon conscious reflection, 
as for example when the applicability of a section of a legal 
document such as the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
to a particular situation ie. deter.mined. .But at this 'point such 
sentences become part of langage, and are no longer part of parole. 
The experience of lexicographers, moreover, is that mea.ninge 
for lexical item.s are extraordinarily difficult to pin down, even 
if dialect differences are overlooked (we may view the task of 
a lexicographer, at the risk of sounding prescriptive, a5 dealing 
with the meaning of an item in a standard language), one can 
almol;!t never be sure that some element ha.a been overlooked, or 
conversely that some superfluous material has been included. 
Alternative ways of defining items are almost always possible, 
and constderatione of eimplicity or elegance are often of no 
help in choosing among alternatives, and may be downright mis-
leading. Nevertheless, one has the feeling that the 1exicographer 1 s 
job is well-defined. In fact, it may well be the very fact that-lexical items have meanings that make5 it sometimes difficult to 
put some particular semantic content into worda--those that come 
to mind possess shades of meaning which do not contribute to or 
even subtly contradict the intended semantic content. Convera.ely 
it is possible to speak meaningfully but w~thout conveying 
semantic content. &~pty talk is possible precisely because lexical 
items carry meaning and can be strung together such that the 
impression of semantic content is conveyedt but not any actual 
content. 
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5. Meaning and semantic content further contrasted. 
It is well-known that the meanings of ~any kins~ip predic~tes, 
for example. uncle I involve t,he ex:i,.~tence of part,ies .other than 
those which comprise its arguments. Thua for.! 1;.o be the unc.le 
of l.,.. it mu.st be the ease that xis either a brother or the hus-
band of a sister of one of .!'s parents. Yet it is unlikely that 
one has in mind these intermediate parties when one uses terms 
in sentences, for example: 
(18) Bill's uncle is in the Peace Corps. 
,I.ndeed it is most likely .that children acquire the ability to use 
such terms appropriately long before they learn their definitions. 
Even adults can be caught off-guard and not i!!l!fled;iately perceive 
any internal incompatibility in such sentences as (4) or even 
the folloi'ling: 
(19) My grandfather was childless, the poor man. 
This suggests that the semantic content of sentences ,containing 
such predicates does not invohre the intermediate parties refer-
red to in the definition of those predicates; moreover that the 
semantic content of sentepces is com~r.e~end~d by chil~ren long 
before characterizations of th~ meanings of lexic~l }tems arise 
in their minds. It goes wit~out saying th~t the meaning of 
particular items may change for people over t~me, or may become 
completely forgotten. 
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